CRITICAL POSITION
TRUTH IN THE WORLD WITHOUT
If the world is not really a dream of our own, then the most destructive belief we could possibly believe would be the denial of this primary fact. It would be like closing your eyes while driving, or blissfully ignoring the doctor's warnings. 1
— C. S. Lewis
The World Situation
We are certainly living in an era of unprecedented change — witnessing the creation of what Manual Castells calls a fundamentally new society. Indeed we cannot ignore the role of rapidly changing technologies in helping to establish the current paradigm shift. But technology itself does not "reveal," (in the Heideggerian sense) the root cause of this societal transformation. We have assuredly already passed the threshold of this new age, but that into which we have wandered is a dusk, not a dawn. Society has now fully embraced a universal skepticism and a universal subjectivism. People are now so convinced that there can be no objective truth that he is laughed at who would ever claim to actually know truth. We so fear to suppose any truth that our uni-versities must more accurately be called plura-versities — for, it would be seemingly preposterous for them to even attempt to narrow one's mind so that he claims to know that which is uni-fiable and objectifiable.
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This world order believes that truth died when we killed God. Shall we not be at least unsettled by this supposition? Was the Nietzschean madman not correct to panic?
How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on all the time? 2
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The end of truth would be no less than an utterly terrifying experience. But allow me the opportunity to make the claim that today's universal skepticism and subjectivism are, in themselves, completely illogical, unworkable, and un-true. Let us briefly examine these concepts individually.
Universal skepticism purports that no truth is knowable. Boston College philosophy professors Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli assert that this is "immediately self-contradictory; for it claims to know that it is true that no one can know the truth." But what if we add the popular amendment, "with certainty"? The problem here is this: is the theory itself only probable or certain? If certain, it contradicts itself. If probable, is that certain, or only probable? Et cetera ad infinitum.
Universal subjectivism is similarly self-contradictory. It claims that all truth is "in" or dependent on the knower. The contradiction lies in the subjectivist claim that truth really, objectively, is subjective. If they claimed only that the subjectivity of truth is a subjective truth, a mere personal opinion in the mind of the subjectivist, then they would not be claiming that their theory was really correct and the other view of truth, objectivity, was incorrect. In this case, they would not be disagreeing with their opponents at all. A subset of subjectivism is the claim that something may be "true for you, but not for me." This statement however, cannot apply to fact-claims — that is to claims about things outside our consciousness, things that are outside us. The law of non-contradiction (X does not equal non-X) shows that such claims must be true or false, not simply all in one's mind. 3 That Mack truck will either hit you, or it will not — the outcome will not be entirely and only in your mind or my mind.
I must then define truth, in order to give meaning to these claims. I go to the master of common sense in philosophy, Aristotle, who defined truth as "saying of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not." This is an identity theory of truth; that is, it says that what exists mentally within the knower actually derives directly from, and becomes a mental repeat of the form or nature of the thing known.
This is not a pragmatic theory of truth, that truth is "what works." For, what is true is not always practical, it does not always work (e.g., death); and what works is not always true (e.g., a successful lie). It is not an empiricist theory of truth, that truth is what we can sense. For some things we sense are not true (e.g. mirages) and some things that are true are not sensed (e.g. 4 x 4 = 16). This is not a rationalist theory of truth, that truth is what can be clearly and distinctly understood by reason — that it may be proven. Many important truths cannot be proven — for example, "there are good and bad, and both exist in every human;" or "life is worth living." It is not a coherence theory of truth, that truth is not a relationship between an idea and its external object, but the coherence or harmony among a set of ideas. This is a linguistic confusion: "for we already have words for coherence, consistency, wholeness, and totality, and we do not need another one — truth — especially when that other one already has a distinct and useful meaning." 4 Finally, this is not an emotivist theory of truth, that truth is what I feel. While feeling truth and knowing truth sometimes coincide, truth is often not felt emotionally at all — for example, "there are four paper clips in the waste-basket." All of these theories presuppose Aristotle's identity (or correspondence) theory. Each claims that it is really true, that it corresponds with reality, and that others are false, they fail to correspond with reality.
In the phrase "objective truth," what does "objective" mean? It does not refer to an unemotional, detached, or impersonal attitude. Truth is not an attitude. It is not how we know, but what we know. It does not mean, "known by all." Even if everyone believes a lie, it is still a lie. It does not mean "publicly proved." An objective truth may be privately known — for example, the location of a hidden treasure. It may also be known without being proven. To know is one thing, to give good reasons for your knowledge is another. What objective means here is this: "Independent of the knower and his consciousness." 5 "I itch" is a subjective truth (though still possibly true); "Plato wrote the Republic" is an objective truth.
I say all this to make this conclusion: the abandonment of a willingness and desire to acknowledge and seek and know objective truth is disastrous. The post-Nietzschean era, with its unblushing Zarathustrian dismissal of objective, identifiable truth and moral code has been by far the most violent century the world has known. And not only has life itself fallen victim to the supposed lack of truth, but also the pursuit of meaning in life. The rejection of meaning has been made an agenda. As Aldous Huxley wrote:
For myself, as, no doubt, for most of my contemporaries, the philosophy of meaninglessness was essentially an instrument of liberation. The liberation we desired was simultaneously liberation from a certain political and economic system and liberation from a certain system of morality. We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom, we objected to the political and economic system because it was unjust. The supporters of these systems claimed that in some way they embodied the meaning of the world. There was one admirably simple method of confuting these people and at the same time justifying ourselves in our political and erotic revolt: we could deny that the world had any meaning whatsoever. 6
Notice that the denial of meaning is not rooted in truth-claims, but in its supposed interference with desire and justice. As Huxley went on to say, "Those who detect no meaning in the world do so because, for one reason or another, it suits their books that the world should be meaningless." 7 Notice also that the desire for sexual freedom came before the desire for meaninglessness. Kreeft and Tacelli reveal that "almost always, the [subjectivist] practice comes before the theory; moral sensualism precedes epistemological sensualism. Addicts cannot see objective truth clearly." 8
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Skepticism and subjectivism lead to an accepted lack of meaning. This is made real by the mere existence of a so-called "Generation X," a group of people with no identifiable meaning. This condition, though, is not a result of conclusions of truth, but of deliberate rejections of truth which derive from the lack of willingness to seek truth. This is an almost universal logical laziness which pervades every aspect of society today.
Therefore, it is my ethical responsibility in response to a societal misjudgment to believe, to act in accordance with, and to represent the existence of objective truth. It follows that it is my moral responsibility to seek this truth, believing that it may be known.
A Genealogy of Objective Truth
Here is a small selection of works that identify the situation of skepticism and subjectivism, and support the claim for objective truth.
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Peter Bocchino, "What Is Ought to Be," Just Thinking, Fall, 1994.
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Norman Geisler, When Skeptics Ask (Dallas: Word, 1992).
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Os Guiness, Unriddling Our Times (Nashville: Nelson, 1999).
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Dennis McCallum, ed., The Death of Truth (Chicago: Tyndale, 1994).
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Ravi Zacharias, Can Man Live Without God (Milton Keynes, England: Word, 1994).
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Ravi Zacharias, "The Inextinguishable Light," Just Thinking, Fall, 1996.
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The above sources, as well as the writings of well-known linguists and theologians G. K. Chesterton and C. S. Lewis are powerful influences on the topics presented here. Additionally, my Christian faith cannot be separated from any step I take in any direction with regard to any topic in my life.
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Defining Critical Architecture
We come then to the realm of art, and by inclusion, architecture. What is the role of art with regards to truth and meaning? First, we must understand that the existence of objective truth itself does not propose the non-existence of subjective truths. Also, we must understand that while objective truth is the same between individuals, subjective truths are not necessarily the same. "There is a painting on the wall." (Objective truth, according to one person.) "It is beautiful." (Subjective truth, according to that person.) "There is a painting on the wall." (Objective truth, according to the next person.) "It is heinous." (His subjective truth.)
The role of critical art, then, is to call upon its observer to note not only subjective observations (such as beauty) but also to evoke reflection upon objective truth (such as the existence of suffering). This demands that the observer be teachable, which requires great mental effort and activity, and the effect of critical art will be lost upon he who will not allow for reflection. C. S. Lewis stated:
The first demand any work of art makes of us is surrender. Look. Listen. Receive. Get yourself [your subjective thoughts] out of the way. There is no good asking first whether the work before you deserves such a surrender, for until you have surrendered, you cannot possibly find out. 9
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Architecture, in my understanding, is that art which has as its process design, and which has as its end a real or imaginary indwelt object. It follows from above that critical architecture is that architecture which calls upon the subject or inhabitant to reflect upon objective truth. (Again, whether this reflection occurs is largely a function of the mindset of the subject.)
Any indwelt object, whether a doghouse or a statehouse, may fit within this definition, as long as the call to reflection is present. The embodiment of such critical architecture may be either the spatial or the material, and this is determined by the particular instance of the architectural process, the design. Being that it calls into consciousness objective truth, it must be understood as representing a stable idea or thing, while acknowledging a vast body of truth that evolves, but remains faithful to its foundations and origins. The criterion for setting critical architecture apart from that which is not critical, is through asking the Aristotelian question, "Does it say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not?" (Of course, this question may be answered in the affirmative, even if the object represents a twisted sense of reality, because by doing so, it reflects upon reality.) Any specific instance of architectural design may embrace a relationship with a vast array of other disciplines — the sciences, its inhabitants, literature — in the process of understanding truth.
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The architectural discipline is that realm of thought that encompasses fields that examine architecture from every angle, including historically, phenomenologically, psychologically, and practically. Architectural practice is that part of the architectural discipline that actually performs the process of design in order to produce architectural objects — real or imaginary. Theory is the thought process that guides practice. Critical theory is the aspect of architectural process, which may or may not be present, that challenges the practitioner to embrace substantive development of a design with attention to objective truth and not simply subjective concepts such as beauty.
Proposition of an Objectively Critical Architecture
As is absolutely apparent with regard to the above arguments, it is understood that, while subjective truths are inherent whenever a subject encounters an artistic object, objective truth must be considered as well for the object to amount to critical architecture. The meaning will be found, whether materially or ephemerally, in the way in which the architecture elevates truth. Because the body of society holds much objective truth in the realm of common accord, the use of the "social project" in order to elevate an objective truth is effective but not compulsory. The elevation of truth may just as importantly be discovered on a body scale, as opposed to a societal scale. (Though this in still not mandatory.) Normative architectural practice has as its references both the avant-garde and the arrière-garde, and it may learn from both positions effective critical patterns of design. Part of reality is the existence of constraints (e.g. client needs, desires, and budgets), and an effective response to objective truth requires the acknowledgement of constraints and workable solutions. Also part of reality is the existence of physical and historical orders of context, and critical architecture may only be practiced when a conscious attitude is taken toward these orders. Part of context is ecological reality, and architecture must not be practiced in denial thereof. Architecture that produces substantive reflections or conclusions about truth without producing a physical object should be seen as of equal importance to its alternative, and object-obsession should therefore be avoided.
The Agenda of Objective Critical Architecture
My position is that architecture should not be practiced in a way that produces objects that call only subjective issues to the forefront. Architecture must be produced which has as its goal the depth of meaning and the elevation of truth. Objective truth exists apart from and before architecture, and positions regarding truth must therefore be formed beforehand and molded by experience.
1 C. S. Lewis, "The Poison of Subjectivism," in Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967).
2 Frederick Nietzsche, "The Madman," a section of Gay Science in Walter Kaufmann, ed. The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1954), 125.
3Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 367.
4Ibid., 366.
5Ibid., 364.
6Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946), 273.
7Ibid., 270.
8Kreeft and Tacelli, 382.
9C. S. Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism (Oxford: Harper, 1952).